The Rise of Neo-Nativism in Indian Tech Policy: A Lexicon Guide

India’s tech policy of the past few years reads like a new national manifesto: ecommerce platforms are opened up only on Indian terms, global apps are banned on security grounds, and digital infrastructure is explicitly cast as a matter of sovereignty. Policymakers proudly invoke Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) and even colonial history to justify data-localization laws, new digital regulations, and homegrown digital “public goods.”

This article unpacks that neo-nativist trend in Indian tech: its agenda (data sovereignty, DPI and ONDC, tough regulation), its rhetoric (swadeshi, techno-nationalism, post-colonial pride) and its lexicon (e.g. Digital Swadeshi, Tech Sovereignty, Regulatory Patriotism). Along the way, we compare India’s path with parallel moves in the US, EU and China – noting similarities in protecting digital industries, but also India’s unique democratic and ideological context.

Digital Sovereignty and Data Localization

“Digital sovereignty” – the ability of a country to control its own digital destiny – has become a rallying cry in India. As one global forum puts it, digital sovereignty means having control over your data, hardware and software. In practice, India has pursued a range of policies under this banner. In 2018 the government’s National Digital Communications Policy explicitly invoked digital sovereignty, proposing stronger data-protection and cybersecurity measures.

A 2019 draft ecommerce policy even mandated storage of some data locally (though this was diluted later). In August 2023 Parliament passed the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, signaling India’s own GDPR-style regime. (Unlike the 2019 draft, the 2023 Act notably stops short of outright bans on cross-border data flow, though it still lets regulators impose sectoral “localization” rules.)

Beyond lawmaking, the government has incentivized domestic infrastructure: a 2020 draft Data Centre Policy aims to make India a “Global Data Centre hub,” and a 2021 programme for chip manufacturing promises up to $30 billion in support. These steps echo global trends. Indeed, the US and EU recently launched their own Chips Acts to shore up semiconductor supply chains. India’s framing is self-reliant and even anti-colonial: Ministers explicitly warn that foreign platforms must not “work like the East India Company” on Indian data.

However, these sovereignty policies coexist with a more liberal posture as well. In speeches, Prime Minister Modi has portrayed India as a “digital leader” offering a roadmap for other democracies. Officials insist that stronger data rules will uphold India’s constitution and rule of law. In other words, the narrative combines techno-nationalism with democracy: India will control its digital platforms, yet do so as a model for free societies. Together, these drivers – self-reliance, security and post-colonial pride – have translated into concrete measures, from demanding local compliance officers in foreign platforms to drafting competition rules for digital “gatekeepers.”

Data Localization and Trust in the Local Cloud

One core aspect of this agenda is data localization – requiring companies to keep data on Indian servers. India has been an early adopter of such rules. The Reserve Bank of India, for instance, long insisted that payments data be stored locally. Telecom and health regulators have similar mandates. India often positions these as security or privacy safeguards, but they also have  undertones of keeping strategic data “in house.”

The recent Digital Personal Data Protection Act (2023) actually relaxes the old blanket localization clauses, explicitly allowing data flows while retaining the right for regulators to impose location rules. In practice, many sectoral regulators (banks, telecom, insurance, etc.) continue to impose localization. Critics say these rules risk fragmenting the internet, but proponents call it protection from “data colonialism” – a national interest  step to control a resource as valuable as oil.

Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI): A Homegrown Tech Revolution

A striking pillar of India’s tech mix is Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) – government-built digital platforms open for all. The India Stack (Aadhaar ID, UPI payments, Account Aggregators, etc.) is a celebrated example. Aadhaar now covers ~1.3 billion Indians (over 95% of the population), and UPI payment volume has exploded from ~1 billion transactions in 2018 to 83 billion in FY2023. These are public digital commons: the state built them, but both citizens and private fintech thrive on top. For instance, a street vendor in rural Andhra Pradesh can accept a QR-code payment that goes through UPI, because she has an Aadhaar-linked bank account.

This DPI model is hailed as both inclusive and patriotic. It reduces dependence on foreign tech firms for identity and payments, and it has become a point of pride – dubbed India’s “roadmap for developing democracies”. Experts note that unlike a corporate-controlled internet (like the “DC Internet”) or a wholly state-run model (like China’s), India’s open, interoperable architecture is unique. It is even being pitched abroad: countries like Brazil and Indonesia study India’s approach. In policy language, India often calls these “digital public goods” – reflecting a mix of self-reliance and a global welfare claim.

Open Commerce: ONDC and Platform Decentralization

In e-commerce, New Delhi is similarly pushing alternatives to global giants. The Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC) launched in late 2021 aims to create a decentralized, open ecommerce network. It is not an app or a marketplace, but a set of open standards. In theory, any buyer or seller app can plug into ONDC’s protocols. The goal is to let small vendors compete “on equal footing” with Amazon or Walmart-owned Flipkart. For example, payments consortium NPCI and public sector banks have invested in ONDC to onboard millions of rural merchants. The idea evokes “e-commerce swadeshi”: if the biggest online shopping platform is a set of open, transparent rails run from India, reliance on any one foreign app is reduced.

ONDC is still nascent, but it illustrates the platform nationalism push: building India-specific digital infrastructure so that domestic entrepreneurs (rather than just a few massive apps) can flourish. The government even signed a Build for Bharat hackathon to seed startups on this network.

Regulatory Assertiveness: Patriotic Rules for Platforms

Beyond infrastructure, India has become a more aggressive regulator of tech. The argument is explicit: foreign tech companies must serve Indian national interests first. New laws and rules reflect “regulatory patriotism”. For example:

• Stricter Content Rules (2021-23). The IT (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules of 2021 forced global platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Google, etc.) to appoint India-based compliance officers, remove content on government orders, and help trace “first originators” of messages. These rules repeatedly invoke protection of India’s “sovereignty and integrity.” Many critics (and rights groups) say this empowers the state to censor speech; supporters say it enforces Indian law equally on all companies.
• Social Media and Press (2023). In 2023 the government proposed even tighter rules for news and social media, alarming press freedom advocates. India’s rank in the World Press Freedom Index fell (to 161/180 in 2023) as authorities have blocked or threatened journalists’ online accounts critical of the government. The rationale given is national harmony, but critics view this as platform control under the guise of sovereignty.
• Banning Foreign Apps. Arguably the most dramatic measure was the 2020 ban on dozens of Chinese apps (TikTok, WeChat, UC Browser, etc.) under a seldom-used security provision (Section 69 of the IT Act). Beijing-style “digital sovereignty” was cited as justification. Defense analysts note this was retaliation for border clashes, but tech stakeholders point out the consequence: Indian versions of TikTok (such as Josh and Moj) filled the void. By early 2024, Prime Minister Modi was calling on Indians to use domestic apps and digital services – part of his “vocal for local” slogan.
• Competition and Platforms. India has set up a committee to draft a Digital Competition Law, explicitly learning from the EU’s Digital Markets Act. This bill would apply competition rules to a pre-defined list of “core digital services” (gatekeepers). The idea is to curb Big Tech’s clout in India. (Unlike the US, which still debates antitrust, India is pre-emptively moving to regulate potential monopolies)

Together these moves show India’s willingness to enforce its tech rules. When US or EU regulators limp along with antitrust, India is already fining Google and setting rules for interoperability in fintech. When foreign platforms resist, India has threatened blocking their services. In short, the new mantra often is: “Digital sovereignty trumps open market assumptions”. This reflects a blend of national pride and realpolitik: authorities openly treat digital companies as strategic assets, just like telecom or energy.

Cultural and Political Undercurrents

What drives this new tech nationalism? At the core is a cultural-politico vision inherited from India’s independence struggle and current politics:

• Post-Colonial Pride. Indian leaders and commentators often draw analogies between colonial economic exploitation and today’s data economy. As one minister put it, foreign tech firms must not “operate like the East India Company” harvesting Indian data. Scholars note the idea of “data colonialism” resonates widely – India’s past fuels a narrative that digital resources should serve India, not foreign powers.
• Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliance). Since 2020, Modi’s government has explicitly urged citizens and companies to build and buy local. “Self-Reliance” is invoked not just for coal or defense, but for code and chips. In mid-2020 a special “Atmanirbhar App Innovation Challenge” was announced to crowdsource home-grown alternatives to banned foreign apps. Investors and startup CEOs celebrated, calling it a chance for Indian platforms to go global. One tech founder said the move showed India’s strategy “to become digitally secure and independent”. This techno-nationalism has penetrated popular culture too – antivirus software, browsers and chat apps often tout “100% Made in India” with the tricolor flag.
• Platform Nationalism. Indian technocrats talk about creating “national champions” in digital spaces. This isn’t limited to startups: even established firms like Jio Platforms (Reliance Industries) are backed with soft loans, and current rules restrict foreign giants from dominating e-commerce or payments. The recent push for One Nation, One Regulator in payments (the Unified Payments Interface) and cross-border trade hints that India seeks to set the rules for its digital economy.
• Technocratic-Liberal Blend. Typically,India sees these measures through a democratic lens. Officials state that by building a strong domestic tech base, India can better protect citizens’ rights and privacy than under “foreign colonial” platforms. In global forums, India speaks of the “Global South” nations need for their own model of the internet. This self-image drives policy: for example, India champions the idea of “platform trusts” and data intermediaries as extensions of citizens’ rights. Thus, even as it tightens control, India invokes judicial review and public accountability as drivers for its approach (unlike China’s opaque system).

This mix of pride, security and economic strategy defines the lexicon of neo-nativism. 

To help decode India’s narratives around tech policy, which comes from a mix of pride, security, and economic strategy, below is a Lexicon Guide to some key terms and jargon you’ll encounter.

Lexicon Guide

• Digital Sovereignty: The broad idea that a country should control its own digital ecosystem – infrastructure, standards and data flows. India often uses this to justify building local infrastructure (Aadhaar, data centers, chip factories) and strict rules on foreign companies. It’s rooted in the notion that data and platforms are national assets, not global commons.
• Data Localization: A subset of sovereignty, meaning storing and processing data on servers within India’s borders. This appears in laws (banks and telecom firms must keep Indian data at home) and proposals (e.g. local cloud requirements). While pitched as a privacy and security measure, critics call it digital protectionism. India’s new Data Protection Act defers to regulators’ discretion on localization, but sectoral rules (RBI, Insurance, Aadhaar) still mandate it.
• Digital Swadeshi (Digital Swarg or Swaraj): Borrowing from the pre-independence Swadeshi movement, this term means “digital homegrown-ness.” It encourages Indians to use domestically developed apps and services. Examples include the push for “Made-in-India” social media, browsers and even consumer electronics. It is a cultural rallying cry: in 2020, Indian startups heralded the Chinese app ban as a “digital swadeshi revolution” and many consumers started seeking “desi” (desh=i.e. Indian) tech products. In effect, digital swadeshi is a nativist branding of local tech.
• Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI): This is India’s term for government-built platforms that any business or citizen can use (e.g. Aadhaar ID, UPI payments, DigiLocker). DPI is considered a national digital asset. India markets its DPI as a global model: its India Stack has been called “a success story for the world”. In practice, DPI anchors India’s neo-nativism by reducing dependency on any single private company for identity, money transfers or data services.
• Tech Sovereignty: Often used interchangeably with digital sovereignty, but with emphasis on technology and innovation. It implies that technological capabilities (like semiconductors, 5G, AI) must be developed domestically to ensure national autonomy. For India, this underwrites schemes to grow the semiconductor and electronics manufacturing industry. Tech sovereignty rhetoric also justifies support for Indian tech champions (e.g. subsidies for Reliance Jio or Tata’s cloud) so the country is not “paralyzed” by foreign vendors.
• Platform Nationalism: The idea that the government should actively shape digital “platforms” (online marketplaces, social media, app stores) to serve national goals. Practically, this means measures like the ONDC open-commerce network, demands for platform interoperability, or even preferential treatment for Indian app stores. It also encompasses opposition to foreign firms that might sway Indian public opinion. In India’s discourse, platform nationalism is linked to both economic growth and security.
• Regulatory Patriotism: A term coined to describe when regulators explicitly align rules with national interest. This includes things like requiring government data-access, banning certain technologies, or giving preference to domestic firms. For example, India’s 2021 IT Rules require traceability of messages – a controversial rule defended as protecting India’s “sovereignty”. Similarly, Indian regulators have opened anti-trust probes into Amazon or Facebook, partly citing the need to protect Indian businesses. Regulatory patriotism signals that even abstract tech policy is seen through a nationalist lens.
• Techno-Nationalism: A broader ideology linking technological progress to national pride and security. In India’s case, it’s the notion that India must become a “net technology provider” (in Modi’s words) to be a true independent power. It fuels programs like Make in India and Digital India, and explains why leaders talk about winning a “technology war.” In discourse, it often appears in arguments against foreign tech aid (as with Free Basics internet in 2015) or in industrial policy. Techno-nationalism underlies the idea that India can have its own version of Facebook, Amazon, etc., not just import them.

Global Parallels and Contrasts

India’s turn toward digital nativism is part of a wider pattern, but with its own spin. Across the globe, countries are reasserting control over tech:

• European Union: The EU explicitly seeks “digital sovereignty.” It has passed sweeping laws (GDPR, Digital Markets Act, Digital Services Act, and is debating an AI Act) to regulate big tech on privacy, competition and content. Europe’s goal is to protect its data and citizens within a unified market. Like India, the EU links data governance to values (human rights, democracy), but it does so through multilateral rules rather than nationalist rhetoric. Notably, India looks to the EU for ideas: its draft digital competition bill is inspired by the EU’s gatekeeper rules.
• United States: The US historically favored market-driven tech leadership, but is now pivoting toward self-reliance. The 2022 CHIPS and Science Act poured tens of billions into domestic semiconductor manufacturing (mirroring India’s incentives). Washington has also targeted TikTok as a security threat (echoing India’s ban) and proposed stricter privacy laws. Yet compared to India or EU, the US still frames its tech rules largely in security and economic terms, not cultural narrative. In short, Washington wants tech supremacy but is less vocal about nationalism – until recently.
• China: China personifies cyber-sovereignty. Its Great Firewall, national security laws, and the recent PIPL data law ensure the Party controls the internet and data. Beijing explicitly champions domestic tech champions and untrammeled censorship. In this, India is different: it remains a democratic polity (for now) and still hosts most global internet companies (Google, Facebook, etc.). But India is moving a bit closer to the Chinese model of restricting foreign tech, though with more public debate and legal challenge.

India is crafting its own digital playbook—part borrowed, part homegrown, entirely strategic.  Like the EU, it wants rule-making power in the digital domain. Like the US and China, it views tech as a matter of national security. But India is unique in mixing colonial-era nationalism, democratic ambition, and massive ambition for indigenous innovation. The neo-nativist narrative justifies many ends: ensuring security, building local industry, and cultivating national pride.

India’s techno-nationalism is evolving rapidly. On one hand, it has delivered remarkable successes: hundreds of millions use India’s digital IDs and payments, small merchants can reach customers online, and local startups get new opportunities. On the other hand, the same policies risk isolating India’s digital economy, discouraging foreign investment, and even undermining the open internet ethos. Critics worry that “regulatory patriotism” could become a cover for cronyism or censorship.

In the global race for tech power, India clearly wants a leading role and is framing it in nationalist terms. Its leaders are retooling long standing slogans like “self-reliance” and “swadeshi” for the digital age. For policymakers, tech companies and observers, the key is to read between the lines of this new rhetoric. The above lexicon terms and trends offer a decoder ring: Is a policy aimed at genuine resilience and inclusion, or a veiled protectionist move? As India’s tech path unfolds in 2025 and beyond, watching this interplay of nationalism, innovation and democracy will be essential.